The Soviet Union was dissolved on December 26, 1991. Now, more than 32 years later, at least part of the rationale for the U.S. assisting Ukraine is to prevent Russia from expanding its size and reclaiming its superpower status.
In the immediate aftermath of the Soviet dissolution, many (if not most) elected officials (such as the president and members of Congress) did not expect that they’d have to worry about Russia ever again.
Did President George H.W. Bush and his successors miscalculate? Could they have done things differently so that Russia would be a close ally today?
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Hindsight, of course, is 20-20, but that said, Presidents Clinton, Bush the Younger, and to some extent Obama miscalculated. They took for granted that Russia might try to reclaim its former glory. Hillary Clinton pointed that out, but she never got far enough in her campaigns to do something about it. I’m not suggesting that if she became president Putin would be any less emboldened, but at least she vocalized the problem.
Hi Roy, and thank you SOPHIA for this excellent question.
I think it was inevitable that Putin rose to power, and if the U.S. tried to intervene by attempting to control Russia’s politics, that could possibly have alienated enough people to create another “Iran Revolution” situation, which might leave things worse vis-a-vis U.S.-Russia relations than they are now.
I think a different Russian leader might have the foresight to restore glasnost and perestroika.
I agree with Roy here; hindsight is 20/20. I’m not sure that I would label this as much “miscalculation” on H.W.’s part as I would a lack of prescience — the future U.S. involvement in conflicts and regions critical to Russia, such as the wars in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and later Libya and Syria, often without considering Russian interests, fueled distrust between U.S. leaders and Russian leaders.
If there was any miscalculation, perhaps deepening the roots of U.S.-Russia relations immediately following the dissolution.
U.S. presidents are often more aware of broader sentiments and perspectives that will act as support or deterrent to their diplomatic and foreign affairs strategies and actions. On the level of American public sentiment and opinions, Russia and deepening ties with Russia have been derailed by the cultural milieu of American citizens as well as presidents, who are first and foremost, American citizens. They also grew up with a culturally inclined view and attitude toward Russia and thus, expectations of bond or growth in diplomatic ties are also hampered by the constructed dialogue and schema that have made ties with Cuba impossible for the past 70 years. Thus, Russia is not better off on this scale. Americans revile communism and authoritarianism and Russia has remained the most prominent example of such a legacy, and with authoritarianism as the way of governance. This very narrative of history and culture limits American presidents in what they can do, and how much they are really willing to do in terms of engagement with Russia. Therefore, it is not a “miscalculation” so much as it is a maintenance of the norm. At the same time, the basis on which to establish Russia as an ally given both its legacy and stance on democratic values would be challenging. What rationale would an American President provide both Congress and the American people for developing close ties with Russia? There was indeed a lack of vigilance and adequate preparation to rebuff Russia’s political ambition and expansionist zeal under Putin. At the same, what about the rest of Europe and their leaders?
This is a rather loaded question but it is one that can be answered with some level of confidence that he did the best he could as any U.S. President dealing with Russia in our time. We must not forget that the USSR dissolved during President George HW Bush’s administration. Let’s not also forget that despite the USSR’s dissolving in 1991, its aim has always been the same. So, that dissolution was a critical piece and critical time in foreign policy relations with Russia as to not cause instability for the European region and global community.
A lot of the approach was rooted in geopolitics and avoiding regional and global instability (in agriculture, territorial conflicts, and migration). Additionally, during that time, Russia was struggling to transition into the global economy, going from a state-run agricultural model to now steadily becoming one of the world’s biggest producers of certain agricultural commodities from wheat to vegetables. This is to say that like China, who is the largest producer in the world of agricultural commodities, producing over at least 80% of the world’s commodities, Russia has learned the power of agricultural commodity as this gives it an advantage in foreign relations.
However, during President George H.W. Bush’s administration and today, the U.S. does a sufficient job in balancing interests and keeping Russia’s aims at bay. The U.S. has done this through the Jackson-Vanik Amendment of the Trade Act of 1974 supporting smaller potentially Russian-allied countries to become more independent and less dependent on Russia.
In hindsight, evaluating the effectiveness of past decisions made on foreign relations with Russia requires distinctive analysis. While certain actions may have been taken with the best intentions, the complex nature of geopolitics and evolving national interests emphasizes the challenge of accurately predicting outcomes. Ultimately, constructive engagement and diplomatic efforts remains hallmarks in shaping future relations with Russia and advancing shared interests, where appropriate.
Some of the comments submitted on this topic are quite interesting and certainly insightful in many respects. However, if I may take a slightly divergent approach to the question and suggest that it was not necessarily a miscalculation on the part of any US President but perhaps a misinterpretation or failure to appreciate the human aspect of the former Soviet leadership who remained the leadership of the new Russia. Hard men like Putin who grew up in the KGB held, still hold, a firm vision of what Russia was and should always be…an authoritative state bent on domination of those around them. Perhaps our Presidents between the period of 1991-2008 were swayed by the hope of continuing better relations with Russia and lost sight of who they were really dealing with in the former KGB officer. Russia was a partner in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Relations in many areas were improving. The Olympics in Sochi were widely attended compared to previous games in the old Soviet Union. Aside from some questionable and sometimes violent handling of issues inside Russia much of the West still did not yet view a rising Russia as a major threat. All this came tumbling down when Putin annexed Crimea. Since 2014 it’s been a steady increase of Russian aggression and threatening behavior as they returned to the kind of state they were as the Soviet Union. Almost like how a frog will die when placed in a pot of water that is slowly brought to boiling, the rest of the world stood idly by while the Russian Bear slowly woke up to become once again a threat to many. Could Bush in 1991 have foreseen this happening? Maybe, but not likely. The best option would have been for him and all the other Presidents who came after to maintain a position of caution when dealing with Russia.